The concept of emergence : a brief history and a philosophical analysis of an ontological regulative principle of organization by Manzocco, Roberto
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF EMERGENCE. 
A BRIEF HISTORY AND A PHILOSOPHICAL  
ANALYSIS OF AN ONTOLOGICAL REGULATIVE 
PRINCIPLE OF ORGANIZATION 
 
Roberto Manzocco 
City University of New York 
roberto.manzocco@gmail.com 
Orbis Idearum, Vol. 6, Issue 2 (2018), pp. 11-32. 
ABSTRACT 
Emergence is it is a concept that should undergo more careful philosophical analy-
sis. This paper aims to promote the idea that “emergence” should be taken as an on-
tological regulative principle (rather than a conceptual instrument able to provide a 
quick empirical answer to many concrete scientific problems). The usefulness of the 
proposed approach rests in the fact that it could work as an overarching theoretical 
framework for the ever-growing body of theories and empirical data provided by 
natural and social sciences; it could also help to overcome (at least partly) the ex-
treme over-specialization that characterizes contemporary knowledge. Furthermore, 
it could work as a programmatic framework for comparing and combining data and 
theories belonging to very different fields – from the natural to the social sciences – 
but related to one single, very complicated entity, that is, Man. So, after a short his-
tory of the concept of emergence, an analysis of its ontological nature will follow; 
then some specific philosophical problems – like the metaphoric aspects of the 
emergentist approach, or the ontological unification of every kind of emergence – 
will be discussed. Afterward this paper will provide a few reasons for supporting a 
regulative approach to emergence and will illustrate its advantages – supplying an 
example/proposal taken from the debate about free will. 
1. INTRODUCTION: EMERGENCE EVERYWHERE 
There is a lot of talk about “emergence” going on these days; indeed, it 
seems that emergence is back, and that this venerable – although controver-
sial – concept is joining other popular buzzwords, such as “system,” com-
plexity,” “non-summativity,” “wholeness,” and so forth. In fact, a lot has 
been written in recent years about the “re-emergence of emergence” (e.g., 
Clayton and Davies 2006, Bedau 2008). 
The vocabulary produced by so-called “system science” has definitely 





It is possible to find it everywhere, often connected with other philosoph-
ical concepts, like “existence.” One example of this is the Dutch theoretical 
physicist Erik Verlinde and his hypothesis of “Entropic Gravity,” according 
to which gravity is not a fundamental interaction, but probabilistically 
“emerges” from physical systems’ spontaneous tendency to increase their 
level of entropy (Verlinde 2010). Another example – taken from applied re-
search – is systems biology, a collective name for a certain number of trends 
of contemporary biotechnology and biosciences (e.g., Alon 2006) strongly 
focused around the goal to discover and produce emergent properties in liv-
ing systems. Philosopher Craig Callendar (Callendar 2010) writes in «Scien-
tific American» that time and change are illusions, as they “emerge from a 
universe that, at root, is utterly static,” implicitly stating that emergence is 
the opposite of existence – that is, if something emerges, this means that it 
does not properly exist – and so endorsing a form of “mereological nihil-
ism.” And these are just three examples out of many. 
The notion of “emergence” is getting trendy, so it should undergo a more 
careful philosophical analysis. After a short history of the concept of “emer-
gence,” this paper will analyze the proposal that this concept should be taken 
as an ontological regulative principle of organization (rather than a concep-
tual instrument able to provide a quick empirical answer to many scientific 
problems). The usefulness of the proposed approach will be then illustrated 
(which rests in the fact that it could work as an overarching theoretical 
framework for the ever-growing body of theories and empirical data pro-
duced by natural and social sciences, and could also help to overcome, at 
least partly, the extreme over-specialization that is characterizes contempo-
rary knowledge). And as one of the central debates about human nature, that 
is, free will, has arguably reached a “theoretical stalemate,” an emergentistic 
program to set this discussion in motion again will be proposed. 
2. BRIEF HISTORY OF A CONTROVERSIAL CONCEPT 
In his book Emergent Evolution: Qualitative Novelty and the Levels of Real-
ity, historian and philosopher of science David Blitz writes that the term 
“emergent” was used for the first time by George Henry Lewes (Blitz 1992). 
Lewes compares and opposes, in his Problems of Life and Mind (1874-
1879), two words, “resultant” and “emergent”: the latter indicates an unpre-
dictable trait or effect, which cannot be explained through the mere sum of 
its components. Lewes was following the idea – coined by John Stuart Mill – 
of “qualitative novelty,” as in the example given by Mill about the properties 
of water, which cannot be reduced to those of hydrogen and oxygen. In fact, 
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the first thinker to talk about emerging qualities was Aristotle, who in his 
Metaphysics characterized composite entities as “having a number of parts 
where the totality is not a heap but the whole is something besides the parts” 
(Book H, 1045:10). During the Twenties, emergence and emergentism found 
several followers, like Samuel Alexander, Roy Wood Sellars, Arthur 
Lovejoy, the South-African politician Jan Smuts (father of another important 
systemic concept, “holism”), Charlie Dunbar Broad, and Conwy Lloyd Mor-
gan. The latter published three works on this topic: Emergent Evolution 
(1923), Life, Spirit and Mind (1926), and The Emergence of Novelty (1933). 
In spite of their differences, all these thinkers and theorists have common 
ground, namely, the idea that the world is built like a ladder, composed of 
well identifiable strata, paralleled by an analogous stratification of the natu-
ral and social sciences. Of course, the fundamental level is the physical one, 
followed by the chemical, the biological, the psychological, and the social. 
And of course the disposition of layers follows criteria of growing organisa-
tional complexity. 
From many points of view emergentism is a monist substitute for an ob-
solete approach, vitalism, but actually emergentism had, from the beginning, 
a broader focus: while vitalism regarded only living systems, emergentism 
aimed to include in its theoretical web the whole of reality. But how did the 
first emergentists define “emergence”?  
Lloyd Morgan said that “Under what I call emergent evolution stress is 
laid on this incoming of the new. Salient examples are afforded in the advent 
of life, in the advent of mind, and in the advent of reflective thought” (Lloyd 
Morgan 1923). Interestingly, Lloyd Morgan’s view was not a real scientific 
theory, but a philosophical one, as it did not introduce specific, concrete 
causal mechanisms able to explain the phenomenon of emerging properties 
(Blitz 1992). 
In the landmark work The Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925), Broad 
added a concept strongly tied with the idea of emergence, namely the idea of 
“level,” and introduced a fundamental distinction between “intra-ordinal 
laws,” referring to events and objects belonging to a specific level or order, 
and “trans-ordinal laws,” related to the development of higher-level proper-
ties from lower-level ones. 
In the Thirties an emergentist multi-level view of life was advanced by 
embryologist Joseph Needham (Needham 1937), and in 1940s by Julian 
Huxley (Huxley and Huxley 1947) and by biologist Alex Novikoff in a well 
known article published in «Science», The Concept of Integrative Levels in 
Biology (Novikoff 1945). 
During the Fifties, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, an Austrian biologist and 
philosopher already famous for his works on theoretical biology, inspired the 




which led to the foundation – in 1956 – of the Society for General Systems 
Research. The meta-scientific and philosophical nature of Bertalanffy’s ap-
proach is clearly illustrated by his goal to unify all sciences and to provide 
them with a conceptual framework capable of being for contemporary sci-
ences what Aristotle’s logic was for ancient ones . Ambitious as it was, his 
program of a unification of all sciences was destined to stay programmatic, 
that is, not to be concretized in any real scientific breakthrough (Bertalanffy 
1968). 
Anyway, the Society for General Systems Research offered, through its 
annual publications («General Systems»), the opportunity to work on sys-
temic and emergentist themes to many researchers, such as Anatol Rapoport, 
Kenneth Boulding, Ralph Gerard, Heinz von Foerster, Russell Ackoff, Don-
ald T. Campbell, Herbert Simon, George Klir, Paul Weiss, James G. Miller 
and several others. 
Among the several other scholars involved with the concepts of emer-
gence and system, we cannot omit Herman Haken – father of “synergetics” – 
and Ilya Prigogine, with his seminal work on non-equilibrium thermodynam-
ics and open systems – which he called “dissipative structures” (see, e.g., 
Haken 1977, Prigogine 1980, Nicolis and Prigogine 1977). 
Of course, during these decades, emergentism and systemic philosophy 
did not lack critics, from Bertrand Russell (1927) – who considered emer-
gent qualities merely epiphenomena without scientific significance – to Ern-
est Nagel (1961) and Carl G. Hempel (1965), who refused to attribute to 
“emergence” any ontological status, as in their opinion this concept was too 
imprecise. According to them, emergence was admissible only as an episte-
mological label, roughly translatable with the expression “so far unexplaina-
ble.” 
3. ONTOLOGY, RATHER THAN EPISTEMOLOGY 
Definitions of emergence vary. Lewes writes: “The emergent is unlike its 
components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced 
to their sum or their difference" (Lewes 1875). Jeffrey Goldstein more for-
mally defines emergence as: "the arising of novel and coherent structures, 
patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex 
systems” (Goldstein 1999). Biologist Peter Corning specifies that systemic 
laws are merely descriptions or patterns, and so they do not actually “gener-
ate” anything and cannot be considered as underlying causal agencies (Corn-
ing 2002). 
Most researchers and philosophers talk about two different kinds of 
emergence, namely a “strong emergence” and a “weak emergence.” For in-
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stance David Chalmers says that 
 
a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level 
domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, 
but truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even in principle 
from truths in the low-level domain. We can say that a high-level phenome-
non is weakly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-
level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning 
that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing the low-level 
domain (Chalmers 2002). 
 
According to this philosopher in the whole universe there is only one single 
strongly emergent phenomenon, namely, human consciousness. The defini-
tion given by Chalmers is quite clear, even clear-cut: there are two kinds of 
emergence that can coexist. I have to disagree with Chalmers: his take on 
emergence – based on the idea of its “uniqueness” – sounds like a kind of 
miracle and has an anthropocentric slant which looks incompatible with the 
scientific understanding of the world. Conjecturing a multi-layered ladder of 
emerging levels makes more sense and sounds philosophically more ac-
ceptable. Similarly, Mark A. Bedau raises doubts about strong emergence 
more broadly, stating that “although (…) logically possible, it is uncomfort-
ably like magic” and that its “mysteriousness will only heighten the tradi-
tional worry that emergence entails illegitimately getting something from 
nothing” (Bedau 1997). 
So, who is right? Is emergence only an epistemological, or subjective 
phenomenon, expressing our (perhaps temporary) ignorance about the facts 
of the world, or is it an ontological, or objective one? The short answer is: no 
one can know. Let us consider the long answer. On the epistemological side, 
it is in fact possible to view “emergence” as an obstacle on the path toward 
the explanation of a certain phenomenon. I do think it is impossible to say 
for certain that a certain entity or process is emergent in a strong sense, and 
this just because one day a reductionist explanation could be found. On the 
ontological side, it is possible to say (as many philosophers have noticed) 
that the reductionist program is, well, just a program. In other words, reduc-
tionism rests on the faith that one day everything will be reduced to some, so 
far unknown, elementary entities. When and if this will happen, concepts of 
emergence and existence will be put on opposite sides, that is, emergence 
will mean the contrary of existence, and every emerging object or process 
will not exist in a proper sense.  
In the meantime, while waiting for a general reduction of everything to the 
simplest entities imaginable, and just to keep natural and social sciences ac-




they are about do really exist. And so, we should hypothesize that biological 
organisms do really exist, that human beings do really exist, that even socie-
ty exists (the latter does not mean to endorse or to thwart any project of 
building a social ontology like Searle’s, a topic too large to be faced here). 
There is a strong reason for this pragmatic choice: in fact, no one can say 
what the ultimate, elementary entities, the building blocks of our world, are. 
So far physical science talks about elementary particles, and sometimes 
about strings; one day, some new entity – closer to the “bottom” of reality 
than particles or strings – could appear. Consequently, any coherent hard-
line reductionist approach implicitly calls for a suspension of every judg-
ment about existence beyond this unknown, ultimate level of reality.  
4. WHY EMERGENCE SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS A STRONG THEORY OF 
EVERYTHING 
The ambition to build an “emergentist theory of everything,” or a “general 
theory of emergence,” should be carefully avoided. The reasons to follow 
this precept are basically two: the need not to fall into what I would like to 
call “systemic hype,” which I think is (from a theoretical point of view) haz-
ardous and rather naïve; and a certain number of de facto limitations, which 
cannot be bypassed anytime soon.  
According to many supporters of the “theory of complexity,” complex 
systems emerge because of simple principles of self-organization, and these 
rules are applicable everywhere, from living beings to human cognition, 
from atmospheric weather to the ebbs and flows of the stock market. In fact, 
everything can be explained with a definitive, unifying, grand self-
organizing algorithm, which could be around the corner. Does it sound re-
ductive, even reductionist? Of course it does, because, to a certain extent, it 
is. But this is exactly the approach embodied during the Eighties by one of 
the main centres working on the theory of complexity, the Santa Fe Institute. 
Research carried out at this institute since the mid-Eighties by diverse schol-
ars (such as Murray Gell-Mann, Doyne Farmer, Stuart Kauffman, John Cas-
ti, Jim Crutchfield and John Holland) brought a lot of theoretical work, many 
popular books and, to tell the truth, a certain degree of opacity and confusion 
to the concept of emergence. For instance, Kauffman talks about a brand-
new “fourth law of thermodynamics,” an immanent organizing principle of 
the universe that resists entropy and manages to combine a clear reductionist 
flavour with a vitalistic opacity (Kaufmann 2000). As – without any irony – 
physicist Doyne Farmer puts it: “It’s not magic … but it feels like magic” 
(Waldrop 1992). In the end, the approach of the Santa Fe Institute tries to 
canalize into physics many philosophical and meta-scientific topics and to 
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find a “third way” between holism and reductionism. But, as shown in the 
case of Kaufmann (among other examples), it fails and it develops a reduc-
tionist, non-philosophical interpretation of the concept of emergence.  
The history of science and philosophy are filled with examples of at-
tempts to explain everything using a few simple concepts and rules, and past 
failures should persuade future systemic thinkers to be more careful in theo-
retically “invading” specific disciplines or in expecting to solve conundrums 
raised by fields and topics very far from the one they were originally trained 
in. 
But there are more important reasons to avoid any attempt to build a 
strong, decisive “general theory of emergence,” namely, some de facto limi-
tations, which are related with a notion strongly tied with the topic of emer-
gence: the concept of level. The first question I would like to raise is: how 
many levels are there? We have seen that Chalmers dismisses the whole no-
tion of a hierarchy of “strong-emerging” levels, while systemic philosopher 
Ervin Laszlo (Laszlo 1972) presents a very articulated model of hierarchy, 
composed of a main hierarchical system and one local – but the latter is just 
an example of a potentially infinite series. The first system, which he calls 
“macro-hierarchy,” represents the purely physical reality, distributed on a 
ladder going from the space-time continuum and elementary particles to gal-
axy clusters and basically the whole physical universe. The local hierarchy, 
called “micro-hierarchy,” is about the terrestrial ecosystem, from organic 
molecules to human society. Of course Laszlo admits other potential micro-
hierarchies, which – according to his model – seem more or less commen-
surable with the terrestrial one. 
My preference goes to Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt, who identify, as 
a working hypothesis, a ladder composed of four primary levels: the physi-
cal-chemical, the biological, the psychological, and the social. They also add 
many interesting details:  
The ontology of levels we attempted to give was framed in a materialist 
and evolutionary perspective that implied that the relation between levels 
was considered to be inclusive, permitting the ‘local’ existence of different 
ontologies, all included within the physical level and non-violating physical 
laws. (…) the biological ontology is local to the extent that different biolo-
gies, different organizing principles of life, may emerge on other planets 
(who knows if life universally takes shape as the natural selection of DNA-
coded genotypes?) (Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt 2000). 
According to them there is a further point of discussion, one about the 
degree of sharpness in discriminating levels and sub-levels: 
One can argue at length about the number of (and demarcations between) 
the primary levels. Our choice of the four levels mentioned was in part 




ous candidates for further primary levels), but what is ontologically im-
portant is that such levels of reality can in fact be rationally distinguished 
(Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt 2000). 
In fact, it is always possible that, in the near future, new and finer and 
clear-cut ontological discriminations will emerge (for example between sim-
ple consciousness and self-consciousness), or that the ontological ladder will 
be completely redefined and redesigned.  
Furthermore, “other ‘local ontologies’ of other higher levels may exist 
within the global, physical primary level, and we cannot tell beforehand 
which other initiating condition for mentality or sociality other ‘local biolo-
gies’ may constitute” (Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt 1997). 
I believe, then, that in the universe there could be an unknown number of 
“parallel hierarchies,” based on principles very different from the ones 
founding our own bio-psycho-sociological ladder. Moreover I want to add to 
Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt’s approach one more consideration: these 
hierarchies could be ontologically non-commensurable to each other; for in-
stance, the number and typology of levels could easily not be in a one-to-one 
correspondence with the levels of any other hierarchy. Inside the same hier-
archy, there is, or there could be, a different kind of emergence for any given 
level.  
All classifications of levels should be taken as preliminary, as further dis-
coveries could force a revision of the number and typology of levels and 
sub-levels. In the end, although I am not persuaded, I have also to admit the 
possibility that no ladder exists at all, and the only truly emergent phenome-
non could be consciousness. So, my question can be restated as: How many 
possible parallel ladders are there? Only one? An infinity? A number in be-
tween? Is there a ladder at all? No answer is possible right now.  
I do however believe that there is a second de facto limitation, which I 
never found explicitly and exhaustively analyzed in scientific literature: I am 
talking about the possible emergence of highly speculative, future further 
levels. This consideration was suggested me by a specific anthropological 
theory, neoevolutionism. While discarding many concepts of social Darwin-
ism (like the idea of progress), this approach maintains that evolution of hu-
man societies can be described objectively and divided into stages, which 
can be measured using empirical criteria – like the amount of energy used by 
a certain civilization or the quantity of information produced. A good exam-
ple of this approach is Leslie White, author of the seminal book The Evolu-
tion of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome (1959). 
Without endorsing all the precepts and ideas of this approach to the social 
sciences, I would like to stress the similarities between White’s ideas and the 
so-called Kardashev Scale, developed in 1964 by the Russian astrophysicist 
Nikolai Kardashev (Kardashev 1964). Highly speculative, the Kardashev 
THE CONCEPT OF EMERGENCE. A BRIEF HISTORY… 
 
19 
Scale measures the level of technological and scientific advancement 
reached by a hypothetical extraterrestrial civilization. The scale includes 
three levels, labelled Type I, Type II and Type III, in accordance with the 
amount of energy a civilization has at its disposal (that is, the energy of its 
planet, of its stellar system, or of its home galaxy). The Kardashev Scale has 
been extended by other researchers, like Zoltan Galantai (Galantai 2003) and 
Michio Kaku (Kaku 2004), who talk about a Type IV civilisation; further-
more, Carl Sagan (Sagan 1973) proposed to add to this classification another 
dimension, related not to the energy available but to the information pro-
duced. An obvious objection to this classification is that, as we are talking 
about a civilisation more advanced than ours, it is impossible to guess its 
true nature and predict its behavior. But from my point of view, the implica-
tions are nevertheless clear: we can easily try to interpret Kardashev’s classi-
fication from an emergentistic viewpoint, that is, to read the types as 
possible levels. Which can possibly lead to even more speculative – maybe 
far-fetched, but surely interesting – questions, which quite probably it will 
prove impossible to answer. For example: How many upper levels of com-
plexity are admissible? Is there an upper limit to the levels of complexity? 
So we have a problem: As we are talking about levels of development be-
yond ours – which could definitely include new emerging properties – how 
can we plan to reach a complete, decisive, and coherent “general theory of 
emergence” any time soon? 
5. UPPER LEVELS: METAPHORICALLY CLASHING AGAINST A WALL 
The topic of upper levels is so interesting that it deserves further analysis to 
underline few other related problems. 
First of all, let us go back to the problem concerning the number of possi-
ble upper levels, and let us ask again: is their number finite, or could it be 
infinite? I am not the only one here to suggest the possibility of the existence 
of an infinite number of levels, or alternatively, an infinite degree of com-
plexity. For instance, in a different but related field, communication theory, 
Paul Watzlawick, Janet H. Beavin and Don D. Jackson suggest a similar 
possibility in reference to human cognitive self-perception – namely, our 
ability to “frame” and “read” our own surrounding reality and our self-
interpretation by encapsulating it in higher and higher conceptual frames, on 
a cognitive ladder which is potentially infinite (Watzlawick, Beavin and 
Jackson 1967).  
Secondly, about “cognitively transcending” upper levels: even if we can 
recognize their possible existence, we cannot say much more about them. 




the very same moment we try to conceptualize them, or even only to think 
about them, we get “pushed back” to our own level of emergence, which in-
escapably “frames” our cognition. To put it in other terms: we can think of 
them because we have at our disposal a metaphoric ladder, on which every 
level is represented by a rung. And so we can see, touch, and analyze the 
rung we are on and the ones below it; in the case of upper rungs, we can im-
agine their existence, but we cannot really reach for them, just because we 
don’t have either the conceptual tools, or the metaphorical ones, to climb the 
ladder beyond our own actual level. Some philosophers think that human 
knowledge is intrinsically metaphoric. From the emergentistic perspective it 
could be useful to take a look at the work of George Lakoff and Mark John-
son on cognitive metaphors. In their seminal book they skillfully showed 
how our knowledge and even our everyday language is packed with meta-
phors of every kind (Lakoff and Johnson 1980); their work could be very 
useful because, besides some aspects of Bertalanffy’s analysis, systemic and 
emergentistic schools of thought never tried to explicitly understand the 
“metaphors they live by” – and this could be a very interesting topic to work 
on in the future. 
Put in other terms: according to Ludwig von Bertalanffy (Bertalanffy 
1968) scientific investigation is developing toward a “progressive 
demetaphorisation”, which means that, step by step, our scientific interpreta-
tion of the world is getting rid of every trait specifically related to the human 
experience. So for example, as our understanding of reality seems visual-
based, quantum mechanics managed to get over it, developing a scientific 
worldview which is inherently “unvisualizable.” Together with the develop-
ment of new technological tools for observation, this process pushed us far 
beyond our daily, visual-based, metaphoric interpretation of the world. All 
this allowed us to eliminate the many limits of our sensory experience – at 
least if we philosophically support a world-view based on scientific realism, 
and not, say, on empiricism or idealism. 
Let us keep in mind that this erasure process already “cleaned” scientific 
investigation of many perceptual traits – colours, smells, sounds – and other 
features (and metaphors) might be cancelled in the future. So, one could ask: 
how far can we get with this process, before being compelled to get rid of 
emergence’s main metaphor, that is, the “ladder”? Will the “ladder” still 
stand? Could it withstand this (alleged) demetaphorization process?  
A related question I would like to raise is the following. There are no real 
ladders, here, we know that, but so far this concept has been very useful – 
together with many other metaphors we live by. So now we should ask our-
selves: is this concept forcing our hand? Maybe the idea of an infinite hierar-
chy is only an unintended and mistaken consequence of a metaphor (the 
ladder) taken too far. 
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Maybe it is even possible that, at a potential level beyond ours, the ladder 
metaphor does not hold; that from the upper level viewpoint there are no 
ladders at all. So one could wonder: while climbing this ladder composed of 
emerging levels of complexity, and trying to reach for the upper rungs, are 
we metaphorically clashing against a wall? 
6. THE PLATONIC WAREHOUSE 
Let us now look at a different order of problems connected with the concept 
of emergence and not yet solved, maybe because they coincide with the 
broadest and deepest problems of philosophy at large (and poorly analyzed 
and understood by many classic emergentistic thinkers). Let us ask: what is 
the ontological “source” of emergence? As I said before, it is possible that 
every level has its own way to emerge from the lower level. In spite of this, 
we aim to find a general theory of emergence, which should conceptualize 
every trait the different kinds of emergence have in common.  
We need an ontogenetic source; so a unifying theory of emergence should 
be really unifying. That is: if there are different kinds of emergence at any 
level and on any possible ladder, they all should be explained through a 
deeper and more general form of emergence, in other words, a theoretic 
“source” of all emergence. And not only that: a general theory of emergence 
which aims to be general in the widest possible sense, should even explain 
itself, namely, explain how emergence emerged in the first place, and how it 
can generally emerge. Of course to expect this question to be answered is 
like expecting an ultimate, complete answer to all the main problems posed 
by theoretic philosophy. Nevertheless, in the fields of systems theory and 
complexity theory, there have been some attempts, but – in my opinion – ra-
ther naïve or incomplete. 
I would like to mention just a couple of them, the “morphic field” of Ru-
pert Sheldrake and the so-called “digital philosophy” promoted by Gregory 
Chaitin, Edward Fredkin, Konrad Zuse and Stephen Wolfram. According to 
the latter scholars – mostly mathematicians and theoretical physicists – eve-
rything that exists – space, time, thought, consciousness – is a consequence 
of a huge, unitary process of computation (Zuse 1969, Fredkin 1992, Wolf-
ram 2002). The whole universe should be seen as a computer of unimagina-
ble size. This self-proclaimed “digital philosophy” reflects the spreading of 
the idea that the process of computation could be everywhere, and actually 
the computational processes performed by human-made computers could be 
seen as a smaller, primitive version – or even a simple manifestation – of this 
huge all-encompassing universal process of computation. As digital philoso-




divided in many sub-streams. I do not think this approach is really persua-
sive, let alone satisfactorily complete, as it does not even try to answer the 
most fundamental question of all: who or what “computes” our reality? Ac-
cording to Friedkin, this “pan-computational” process is carried out by a not-
better-defined “Other,” whose nature we do not know. Another universe or 
dimension? A “meta-universe”? No answer is forthcoming. 
The concept of morphic field was coined by British biologist Rupert 
Sheldrake to indicate an alleged “field of information” which acts as “data-
base” as well as “development drive” for both organic and abstract forms – a 
collective “library” and an ontological and emergentistic “source” (Shel-
drake 1981). I would say that Sheldrake’s approach is vitalism, plain and 
simple, while digital philosophy’s is reductionist. But at least someone – in-
side the variegated complex systems community – is trying to answer the 
following question, which I never saw explicitly stated: where are the levels 
of complexity we see around us from? Are they totally, genuinely “new”? 
and if so, what is the source of this “novelty”? Can it be conceptualized like 
the age-old idea of creatio ex nihilo? On the contrary, if those levels of 
emergence are not really “new”, but already implicitly existent, “where” are 
they before coming into existence? Are these upper or alternate, not-yet-
existent levels stored in a kind of “Platonic warehouse” or in a Popperian 
“World 3”? What really matters here is the fact that the problem of origin or 
source of emergence looks very far from being solved. 
7. WHY EMERGENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A REGULATIVE PRINCIPLE 
INSTEAD 
My partial conclusion is: there is so much philosophy in emergentism and 
theory of complexity, and so little recognized. This “elephant in the room,” 
these unaddressed philosophical problems, make me state the following: If 
“emergence” has to be interpreted as an ontological concept, this implicitly 
means that it cannot be taken as a simple scientific concept with immediate 
utility. As mentioned above, one of the accusations flung at Bertalanffy’s 
General Systems Theory was about its programmaticity. And what if this 
programmaticity could be turned into something positive, that is, into a vir-
tue?  
Let us make a digression and try to set things right about the systemic ap-
proach and the related currents (General Systems Theory, Theory of Chaos, 
Theory of Complexity, and so on). In spite of many naiveties and few re-
sults, their philosophical intentions are more than noble: to allow, or even 
foster communication among disciplines; to favor the positive interchange of 
concepts and ideas among different fields; in the end, to be a building block 
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for something we have not heard of for a while, namely, a kind of “philoso-
phy of nature.” Like Bertalanffy, and like his more famous forerunners (such 
as Alfred North Whitehead), the contemporary systemic approaches aim to 
go beyond the present separation among disciplines or between Snow’s “two 
cultures,” and rebuild (maybe unrealistically, maybe not) a kind of renais-
sance mentality.  
Although very ambitious, the goal to revive such a typology of philo-
sophical stances is definitely easier to achieve than the construction of an ul-
timate general theory of emergence. Instead, philosophy, and in particular 
systemic thinking, could focus on the creation of a general emergentistic 
“draft” in which to insert (little by little) all the small pieces of data and dis-
coveries about reality that natural and social sciences will find in the near 
and far future. It should be a flexible map, a map able to accommodate “re-
ductionist” discoveries and new, “emergent” processes, and consequently to 
change on demand; furthermore, is should push us to reflect on our emer-
gentistic framework, philosophically asking again and again the question of 
the ontological source of the emergence and the metaphoric nature of the 
concepts it uses. 
The pragmatic approach advocated here – that is, the interpretation of 
emergence as an ontological or meta-scientific framework – could rightly be 
called an ontological “regulative principle of organization,” more or less in 
the same sense that Kant used for the concepts of “soul,” “world,” and 
“God.” 
8. ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
Now a new question arises: What is the point in pursuing this “light” version 
of a general theory of emergence? Why cannot the special sciences keep do-
ing what they have done so far with great results, without caring about other 
disciplines? Is there some advantage in talking about systems, emergence, 
levels of reality, and so forth? 
First of all, as shown above, this approach authorizes from an ontological 
point of view natural and social sciences to talk about their own objects 
without waiting for the discovery of the “bottom” of reality – if it is possible 
to find that at all. To put it in another way: I believe it allows – at least in 
principle – the foundation of every discipline iuxta propria principia (that is, 
according to their own principles). 
Secondly, it could help to reconcile (if this is the goal) the perceptual 
world (that is, the world naively perceived) with the comprehensive 
worldview offered by scientific realism. In other words this emergentistic 




both the data coming from human ordinary perception and the theories and 
data provided by all the different disciplines working on this topic (psychol-
ogy of perception, cognitive neurosciences, and so on). 
Thirdly, it could repair one of the main defects of the classic systemic ap-
proaches. In fact, the picture built by those has many gaps, whether from the 
viewpoint of logic, mathematics, or metaphysics. In other words, while Gen-
eral Systems Theory was meant to be a truly all-inclusive philosophy of na-
ture, many of the contemporary theorists of emergence (although with a 
certain number of exceptions) seem to focus mostly on physics, biology, and 
philosophy of mind, and omit that a “general theory of emergence” should 
be really general, and so should include every kind of system, even the more 
abstract ones. 
Last but not the least, such an approach does foster communication 
among disciplines, and it can definitely help to find a way out of the over-
specialization that plagues contemporary knowledge, by providing philoso-
phers, natural scientists, and social scientists with at least a common ideal 
goal.  
And now let us just try to offer an example of the usefulness of this pro-
posal. 
9. A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE: DOWNWARD CAUSATION, FREE WILL, AND A NEW 
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
Inside the theory of emergence the concept of downward causation exerts a 
function as important as the one of level; actually we can say that, from 
many points of view, they are one and the same.  
The concept of downward causation implies that events or phenomena 
belonging to a certain level can act upon events and phenomena of the lower 
levels; this specific inter-level relationship, together with its opposite – that 
is, upward causation, which illustrates how some entities at a certain level 
produce other related entities at a higher level – are basically the core of any 
emergentistic philosophy. 
According to Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt, it is possible to hypothe-
size at least three kinds of downward causation: a strong downward causa-
tion, a medium one, and a weak one, all the three defined by the strength of 
their influence on their lower levels (Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt 2000). 
These scholars discriminate three different kinds of downward causation: 
 
The idea of strong downward causality may be briefly described as follows: a 
given entity or process on a given level may causally inflict changes or ef-
fects on entities or processes on a lower level. (…) (It) introduces a non-
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scientific, that is, irrational principle, and violates the assumption of the in-
clusivity of levels. (…) Medium downward causation can be defined as fol-
lows: an entity on a higher level comes into being through a realization of 
one amongst several possible states on the lower level -- with the previous 
states of the higher level as the factor of selection. This idea can be made 
more precise with the aid of an interpretation of the concept of “boundary 
condition.” ...[In the case of weak downward causation] the higher level is 
conceived as an organizational level, characterized by the organization, the 
whole, the pattern, the structure, in short the form into which the constituents 
are arranged. […] it must not be identified with physical or mechanical re-
ductionism; the forms of the higher level are supposed to be non-reducible. In 
contrast to medium downward causation it is characterized by not admitting 
the special interpretation of boundary conditions as constraining conditions, 
and hence it does not allow the possibility that several higher level phenome-
na correspond to one and the same lower level phenomenon. 
 
Emmeche, Køppe and Stjernfelt opt for the third kind, although I believe 
that developments in future scientific investigation could make the first or 
the second one more palatable. Anyway, no matter which kind of downward 
causation one decides to choose, this concept could be a good starting point 
to unify the bulk of knowledge about human beings that natural and social 
sciences – from neurosciences to genetics, from psychology to anthropology, 
to linguistics, to sociology, and so forth – are collecting. This goal could be 
achieved by offering to those disciplines a common vocabulary and a com-
mon web of concepts. A similar attempt was already pursued in the first half 
of the Twentieth Century by the school of philosophical anthropology 
(Scheler 1928, Plessner 1928, Gehlen 1940, Cassirer 1944), and maybe the 
time for a new, perhaps less pretentious attempt is coming – and actually 
some attempts in this direction are already underway (see for example Mur-
phy, Ellis and O'Connor 2009). From this viewpoint, I would like to suggest 
that a philosophical problem worthy to be read within this emergentistic 
mainframe could be that of free will. 
Almost as old as philosophy itself, the debate about existence and nature 
of free will – which continental philosophy sometimes perceives as some-
thing belonging to the Middle Ages and out of fashion – is alive and vital on 
the analytic side of philosophical speculation. And, among the many philo-
sophical problems faced by contemporary thought, free will is one of the 
most interdisciplinary – as it probably lies at the heart of the debate on hu-
man nature (nature versus nurture, genetics versus environment and so 
forth). And in fact this theme can be approached at least from two, maybe 
three sides. 
Fist of all, we can discuss the existence and nature of free will from a 




ministic worldview, if it is indeterminist in its nature, and so on. Related 
with this approach, we have the problem of moral responsibility, or, put in 
other terms, the compatibility of this or that idea of free will with our social 
and ethical habit to keep human beings accountable for their actions. This 
approach produced a great number of different positions (from compatibil-
ism to incompatibilism, from hard determinism to metaphysical libertarian-
ism, all interwoven in many ways), and involves too many thinkers to name 
here.  
Secondly, we can investigate different scientific fields – like neurosci-
ences, evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, just to name a few – to 
verify if free will really exists. And actually some researchers, like Benjamin 
Libet, cast doubt not only on the existence of free will, but even on the real 
extent of our self-awareness (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl 1983; Libet 
2004). 
Thirdly, some stimulating research is being done – through the tools of 
contemporary psychological investigation – concerning what regular people 
think about themselves in terms of free will, self-agency, self-efficacy and so 
on (see for example: Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist 2009). 
Although the problem of the nature and coherence of free will, and the 
problem of real existence of free will, are and should be treated as separate 
problems, I think there are a few topics and arguments inside one or the oth-
er battlefield which are interdisciplinary in nature. For instance, at a certain 
point the supporters of an incompatibilist and libertarian take on free will 
tried to provide some evidence to their view quoting quantum physics’ inde-
terminism as a possible source of our free volition. The main proponent of 
this approach – which is indeed fascinating – is Robert Kane, who in his 
book Free Will and Values talked about “probability bubbles” at the roots of 
human volition (see Kane 1985). Far from being satisfied by Kane’s view, 
some philosophers criticized the alleged usefulness of quantum indetermin-
ism in this debate. According to Derk Pereboom neither determinism nor in-
determinism account for free will (Pereboom 2001), and criticism toward the 
quantum interpretation of the latter is expressed also by J. J. C. Smart, who, 
in a famous passage, notes that: “Indeterminism does not confer freedom on 
us: I would feel that my freedom was impaired if I thought that a quantum 
mechanical trigger in my brain might cause me to leap into the garden and 
eat a slug” (Smart 2003). 
In my opinion what matters here is not these quantum physics interpreta-
tions’ soundness, but rather the fact that they utilize concepts and ideas be-
longing to a completely different field, without much discussion about the 
relationship between quantum phenomena and bio-neurological ones – 
which is exactly what an emergentist worldview would and should do. In 
fact, if one decides to endorse a general theory of emergence and to support, 
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say, a strong view of downward causation, any interpretation of free will in 
the light of quantum mechanics indeterminacy would sound reductionist at 
least, and then should be dropped or revised. In other words, here is my pro-
posal: the emergentist model could work as a tool to test free will not in it-
self, but against the natural order as we know it (the whole body of physical 
laws, the emergentist ladder, and so on). 
Another interesting point is the following. Social sciences and psycholo-
gy provided us with a rich amount of data about many different topics appar-
ently not related to the problem of free will, which actually are connected 
with it in various degrees: for example, we could talk about the nature and 
existence of introspection (which could be seen as a tool to process free de-
cisions), the related topic of meta-cognition, long term planning and – more 
broadly speaking – a theme underlying every specifically human trait, that is, 
abstract symbolic language. I think that an emergentist model offers a 
framework in which we can distribute and accommodate all the growing in-
terdisciplinary knowledge relative to free will provided by social and natural 
sciences. Let us put it in other terms. Neurosciences are providing their own 
take on free will, and some researchers are actually denying it or even sug-
gesting that our thought is mostly unconscious – and therefore outside free 
will’s reach. This is exemplified by the case of Benjamin Libet’s work on 
readiness potential quoted above. So, one could provocatively ask: what’s 
the point in defending, say, a libertarian version of free will if – in the mean-
time – some neuroscientists basically state that it is just an illusion? That is 
why trying to have different fields talking to each other through an emer-
gentistic common ground could be a good and fruitful thing. 
A third point is related to the idea of “degrees of freedom”. One could 
think that free will is not about “all-or-nothing”, that there can be many di-
versified constraints which compel us to talk about “degrees of freedom”. 
This approach is known as “restrictivism”: the idea that only a small number 
of human actions is really “free”. For example Kane talks about “self-
forming actions”, related to moral, all-important decisions difficult to evalu-
ate and take (Kane 2007). Imagining these really “free” actions existing 
along with or fighting against other non-free actions and thoughts could help 
to make sense of an age-old philosophical topic, the problem of the “weak-
ness of the will,” that is, actions taken against our best judgment. And so I 
believe that the emergentist view could allow us to unravel the different 
causes of human actions, partitioning them according to the field and the 
emergent level they belong to, correctly connecting them to each other and 
tidying up this whole topic. Another example could be Harry Frankfurt’s hi-
erarchy of desires (Frankfurt 1971), which could be easily accommodated in 
an emergentist view of the mind. 




ti-deterministic, but also anti-indeterministic), one could find in emergence a 
good setting to locate this apparently counter-intuitive position. Usually the 
inexistence of a third quid between necessity and randomness is taken for 
granted, but some philosophers would like to find a “third way” between de-
terminism and pure chance, in order to save both moral responsibility and 
real freedom, establishing human nature as something completely autono-
mous (causa sui). Easier said than done, but if there is even a small chance to 
achieve this goal, it probably lies in an emergentistic model (incidentally, I 
like this controversial idea of a possible “third way” to free will, although I 
think that, at least for the time being, it retains a certain degree of opacity). 
More generally speaking, we could easily institute a parallelism between 
free will conceptions and downward causation conceptions, to see how many 
different kinds of downward causation are possible with emergentism; if 
they can fruitfully accommodate different takes on free will; and which of 
the latter are compatible with what it is scientifically established about hu-
man beings. 
In the end, what can a theory of emergence do for free will? An emer-
gentist model could provide a frame of reference to systematize all the inter-
disciplinary knowledge about free will, in what can be seen as a program of 
cross-fertilization. It is just a program, but isn’t emergentism intrinsically 
programmatic? 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
Summarizing all the ideas expressed in this paper: 
1. Emergence is back, and this concept can be found in many different 
disciplines. 
2. Although it could seem mainly a scientific notion, it is a philosophical 
one, with a long history. 
3. That is why it should undergo again and again a careful philosophical 
analysis. 
4. It should be considered an ontological notion rather than an epistemo-
logical one, just because pragmatically speaking it confers ontological au-
tonomy to every discipline. 
5. Emergence should not be taken as an ultimate, even arrogant “Theory 
of Everything,” because such an attempt would face many de facto obstacles, 
like the factual impossibility of knowing precisely how many levels of reali-
ty there are, how many there could be, and how many different local ontolo-
gies exist. 
6. There are many philosophical problems related to a theory of emer-
gence still to be adequately answered, such as the nature and possible num-
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ber of upper levels, the implicitly metaphoric nature of some emergentist 
concepts – like the “ladder” – and the ontological source and status of exist-
ing and future levels of complexity. 
7. Emergence should be taken as an ontological and meta-scientific regu-
lative principle of organization, because it is a flexible approach and could 
help philosophy, natural science and social sciences to systematize and or-
ganize the data they are discovering and the theories they are developing lit-
tle by little. Furthermore, this approach could satisfy – first of all, by 
recognizing it – the “human, too human” ambition and burning desire to 
know the truth in its entirety, or at least to come closer and closer to it, and 
certainly to talk about it. 
8. A core concept of the emergentist worldview, downward causation, 
could be useful in accommodating our ever-growing body of knowledge 
about Man; it could also foster interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, accom-
modate many different positions on existence and nature of free will, and test 
them against what we know so far about the nature of life and the physical 
laws of the universe. 
Although the final destination is beyond our grasp, this is a road worth 
traveling. 
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